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Beginning in the mid to late 1980’s, democracy took root in most countries in the Western hemisphere. This development 
in conjunction with the end of the Cold War led to a revival of the OAS and the initiation of new regional security 
institutions. The strategic framework of the Cold War had consisted in the perception of a threat outside the hemisphere 
and the monopoly of the U.S. government in defi ning and identifying the enemy. As these structures lost relevance, a 
new security agenda came to the fore, encompassing both traditional security threats like territorial disputes and non-
traditional security threats, such as terrorism and drug-traffi cking. Additionally, security was increasingly defi ned as the 
establishment of improved civil-military relations and the collective defense of democracy. However, the war against 
terrorism initiated by the U.S. after September 11, 2001 led to a revitalization of strategic framework of the Cold War. 
Hence, the paper analyzes how the regional security system in the Americas has changed since the early 1990s. It traces 
the major innovations with respect to its legal and institutional framework, the impact of the hegemonic position of the 
United States in the hemisphere and the challenges posed by the emergence of sub-regional organizations.
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A partir de meados dos anos 80, a democracia se enraizou na maioria dos países latino-americanos. Esta característica, 
conjugado ao fi m da Guerra Fria, propiciou o renascimento da Organização dos Estados Americanos (OEA) e a construção 
de novas instituições de segurança regional. O quadro estratégico da Guerra Fria consistia na percepção de uma ameaça 
externa ao hemisfério e monopólio dos Estados Unidos na defi nição e identifi cação do inimigo. Com a perda de relevância 
dessas estruturas, uma nova agenda de segurança veio à tona, incorporando tanto as ameaças de segurança tradicionais, 
como disputas territoriais, e ameaças de segurança não-tradicionais, como terrorismo e tráfi co de drogas. Adicionalmente, 
segurança passou a ser crescente entendida como o estabelecimento de relações civis-militares estáveis e pela defesa 
coletiva da democracia. No entanto, a guerra contra o terrorismo iniciada pelos EUA após o 11 de setembro de 2001 
levou à revitalização do quadro estratégico da Guerra Fria. Esse trabalho analisa como o sistema de segurança regional 
na América se modifi cou desde o início dos anos 90. Sua proposta é traçar quais as inovações no quadro jurídico e 
institucional da região, o impacto sobre a posição hegemônica dos Estados Unidos no hemisfério e os desafi os colocados 
pelo surgimento de organizações sub-regionais. 
Palavras-chave: OEA, segurança regional, América Latina, instituições regionais
In 1948, 21 nations of the Western hemisphere signed the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), a)  rming their com-mitment to common goals and their respect for each nation’s sovereignty. Simultaneously, they 
also adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, the ! rst international statement of its kind. 
* e OAS Charter a)  rmed that one of the central purposes 
of the organization was “to strengthen the peace and se-
curity of the continent.” According to Chapter VI of the 
Charter, the organization de! nes itself as a system of col-
lective security, and from its very start, the creation of con-
" ict resolution mechanisms was among the fundamental 
goals of the OAS.
Additionally, as a direct consequence of World War II, 
several treaties and conventions related to hemispheric 
security were issued for which the OAS is depositary. In 
1945, at the Inter-American Conference on the Problems 
of War and Peace, held in Mexico City, representatives of 
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20 countries adopted the Act of Chapultepec, which called 
for the region to respond collectively to aggression against 
any American state. Two years later, this concept took form 
in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 
(IATRA) signed in Rio de Janeiro. * e IATRA, also known 
as Rio Treaty, was amended in 1975. However, this reform 
protocol never entered into force due to lack of rati! ca-
tions, and several incidents, like the United States’ active 
participation in the 1954 overthrow of the Guatemalan 
government and its 1962 Santo Domingo invasion, have 
undermined the credibility of this treaty as a security in-
strument (Fontana 2001, p. 42). As an additional instru-
ment designed to regulate con" icts between American 
states, the American Treaty on Paci! c Settlement was 
signed in Bogotá in 1948. It delineated formal mechanisms 
of con" ict resolution which, however, have never been ap-
plied up to now (Kurtenbach, 2002b).
* e OAS Charter also did not specify any measures 
or procedures to be adopted in case of an aggression, and 
during the Cold War, the organization was unable to re-
spond to the ongoing con" icts in Central America and 
the frequent U.S. interventions in its “backyard”. * at is 
why it was regarded as politically irrelevant and entered 
into a long phase of agony during the 1970s and 1980s 
(Frohmann, 1995). Hence, the most important initiatives 
towards security cooperation did not occur before the 
1990s, a fact that is attributable to the end of the Cold War 
as well as to (re-) democratization in most Latin American 
countries. Both factors set in motion a process of rethink-
ing hemispheric security.
In the following section, the paper will outline the 
changes and developments in the regional security system 
triggered by the end of the Cold War and by the democ-
ratization of the OAS member states. Section 3 will then 
evaluate the security challenges the region is facing a+ er 
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Both sections 
begin with a description of the major innovations in le-
gal and institutional framework and subsequently discuss 
their signi! cance. Section 4 assesses the problems and 
prospects for the future of the inter-American security 
system in the light of booming sub-regional organizations.
The End of the Cold War and the Inter-American 
Security System
Since its origins in 1948, the Organization of American 
States has expanded to include the nations of the English-
speaking Caribbean and Canada, giving the OAS a broad-
er perspective that encompasses the entire hemisphere. 
Nowadays, it has 35 member states, with English, Spanish, 
Portuguese and French as its o)  cial languages.
During the Cold War, the OAS was perceived as an in-
strument consolidating the hegemonic status of the U.S. As 
the Cold War intensi! ed, U.S. security concerns and the 
desire to ! ght communism overshadowed all other foreign 
policy goals. In fact, in several instances, the U.S. govern-
ment backed clearly anti-communist authoritarian regimes 
in the region and hindered or even abolished democracy 
(Shaw, 2004, 2007). Hence, the strategic framework of the 
Cold War consisted in the perception of a threat outside 
the hemisphere and the monopoly of the U.S. government 
in de! ning and identifying the enemy.
* e post-Cold War world made a new content of the 
concept of regional security necessary (Hurrell, 1998, 
Sennes, Onuki & Oliveira, 2004). Anti-communism no 
longer served as a guiding principle. On the one hand, 
there still were traditional security threats that had to be ad-
dressed. While interstate war was a remarkably rare event 
in Latin America throughout the 20th century, there have 
nevertheless been a number of militarized interstate dis-
putes or more subtle strategic or enduring rivalries result-
ing from unde! ned ter-
restrial and maritime 
border lines, from con-
" icts about resources or 
from competition for 
regional predominance 
(Child, 1985, Fuentes, 
2008, Grabendor# , 
1982, Mares, 2001). On 
the other hand, the concept of regional security increas-
ingly includes problems like drug-tra)  cking, interna-
tional crime, migration and environmental degradation. 
Additionally, in the course of democratization in the re-
gion, security was de! ned as the collective defense of de-
mocracy and the improvement of civil-military relations, 
both of which are supposed to guarantee stability (for a 
discussion on the renewal of civil-military relations a+ er 
military rule in Latin America, see f.ex. Agüero & Fuentes, 
2009, Fitch, 1998, Mares, 1998, Millett & Gold-Biss, 1996).
Regarded as politically irrelevant, the OAS entered into a long phase 
of agony in the 70s and 80s. The OAS Charter did not specify any 
measures to be adopted in case of an agression, and the organization 
was unable to respond to the ongoing confl icts in Central America 
and the frequent U.S. interventions in its “backyard”.
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Normative and institutional innovations in the 1990s
* e 1991 meeting of the OAS General Assembly in 
Santiago, Chile is considered a turning point in regional 
relations (Fontana, 2001, p. 42, Vaky & Muñoz, 1993). At 
this meeting, the OAS member states committed to the 
renewal of the inter-American security system under the 
changed conceptual and political context a+ er the end of 
the Cold War. During the 1990s, reforms of the existing 
legal instruments and institutions were enacted or at least 
envisioned, and several new legal instruments and institu-
tions were created within and outside the framework of the 
OAS.
Legal instruments
* e Latin American Nuclear Free Weapon Zone, estab-
lished by the 1967 Treaty of Tlatelolco, dates back to the 
1962 Cuban missile crisis and the sense of alarm created 
among states of the region that a superpower nuclear con-
frontation might occur on their soil. * e Agency for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the 
Caribbean (Organismo para la Proscripción de las Armas 
Nucleares en América Latina – OPANAL) is an inter-gov-
ernmental agency created by the Treaty of Tlatelolco to 
ensure that the obligations of the treaty are met. However, 
the extension of the nuclear-free zone to the entire Latin 
America was realized only in 1994, a+ er Argentina and 
Brazil had ! nally refrained from their nuclear programs 
and rati! ed or dropped their reservations regarding the 
Tlatelolco Treaty (Davies, 2004, pp. 57-58).
Important legal instruments created in the framework 
of the OAS during the 1990s included the Inter-American 
Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and 
Tra)  cking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and 
other Related Materials, adopted in 1997, and the Inter-
American Convention on Transparency in Conventional 
Weapons Acquisition. * e latter convention was adopted 
in 1999, and its stated objective is to contribute to regional 
openness and transparency in the acquisition of conven-
tional weapons by exchanging information regarding such 
acquisitions for the purpose of promoting con! dence 
among the states in the Americas (Goldblat, 2003, p. 235).
Another frequently discussed topic was the future of 
the Inter-American Treaty on Reciprocal Assistance. * e 
IATRA had already been signed before the foundation of 
the OAS, but had been incorporated into the OAS Charter 
as security instrument, applicable to the states that rati-
! ed it. According to observers from many member states, 
this collective defense and security arrangement has been 
largely inactive and is outdated and obsolete: Whenever 
an external threat occurred and the Treaty was invoked, 
the invocation merely consisted in declarations of solidar-
ity, but never led to common action. From the perspec-
tive of some other states, however, among them the U.S., 
the IATRA is a useful tool and should stay in force (cf. 
Radseck, 2005, Shaw, 2004). Hence, as far as this Treaty 
is concerned, no reform attempts were made during the 
1990s.
Institutions
While the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty had been de-
signed for collective security and collective defense in or-
der to address threats among members as well as common 
external threats, institutional changes in the 
1990s were characterized by a shi+  in focus 
towards cooperative security. Cooperative 
security arrangements deal with risks rather 
than with threats inside or outside the states 
that constitute it (Wallander & Keohane, 
1999). In this type of arrangement, con" ict 
management refers to con! dence-building 
between rivals and measures to counter the 
risk of political instability. 
* e most important institutional innovation within the 
OAS on the way to a cooperative management of defense 
and security issues was the creation of the Committee on 
Hemispheric Security (CHS). Originally, it came into exis-
tence in 1992 as a special commission through the provi-
sions of the 1991 OAS General Assembly. In 1995, it be-
came a permanent organ. It is chaired by the Permanent 
Representative of one of the member states and holds 
meetings at least once a month. In general, the agenda of 
the CHS is determined by the mandates of the General 
Assembly. Its original task was to discuss and rede! ne 
the concept of security in the region. To this ends, it was 
commissioned to prepare a conference on security in the 
Americas, which ! nally took place in 2003. In addition, 
the Permanent Council instructs the CHS to consider and 
take action on those General Assembly resolutions that 
pertain to hemispheric security. * e CHS might also take 
into consideration other resolutions that, according to its 
Chair, are directly related to its agenda.
Another important topic for which the OAS initially 
did not create a separate institution, but delivered a se-
The 1991 meeting of the OAS General Assembly in 
Santiago is considered a turning point in regional 
relations. At this meeting, the OAS member states 
committed to the renewal of the inter-American 
security system under the changed conceptual and 
political context after the end of the Cold War.
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ries of conferences and declarations are con! dence- and 
security-building measures (CSBMs). To begin with, the 
objective of con! dence-building measures is to contrib-
ute to the reduction, or in some cases, the elimination 
of the causes of distrust, tensions, and hostilities. Hence, 
con! dence-building measures are the main tool to move 
from the logic of confrontation to the logic of cooperation 
(Donadio & Tibiletti, 1998, p. 108, Rojas Aravena, 1998, 
p. 136). Furthermore, con! dence-building is also related 
to democracy: Con! dence-building measures are useful 
devices for the management of civil-military relations in 
countries that, a+ er a period of military rule, are still in the 
process of consolidating democratic institutions (Diamint, 
2000). Since 1992, the General Assembly passed resolu-
tions encouraging member states to carry out diverse types 
of CSBMs and to share information on the implemented 
measures with the other member states. Due to their 
own experiences with those measures, Argentina, Chile 
and Brazil took the lead in promoting the topic. A ! rst 
Meeting of Experts took place in Buenos Aires in 1994. 
Subsequently, the regional conferences in Santiago (1995) 
and San Salvador (1998) on CSBM issued declarations 
which, apart from some general considerations, formulat-
ed recommendations how to apply concrete steps towards 
con! dence-building. * e Declaration of Santiago of 1995 
contains a set of eleven CSBMs whose application is highly 
recommended. * e measures include the participation in 
international security and defense mechanisms, exchange 
of information concerning defense policies and military 
exercises, joint activities and cooperation of neighboring 
countries as well as peace education and courses for ci-
vilians and military personnel. In the Declaration of San 
Salvador of 1998, the list of recommended CSBMs was 
amended (Arévalo de León, 2002, Fontana, 2001, 2003). 
Additional steps toward hemispheric cooperation were 
taken outside the OAS. In 1994, U.S. President Bill Clinton 
invited all presidents and prime ministers of the Americas 
to the ! rst Summit of the Americas which took place in 
Miami. * e Summit was interpreted as a signal of depar-
ture from the former U.S. practice of unilateralism and 
support for authoritarian regimes and towards the promo-
tion of democracy and cooperative politics in the region 
(Fontana, 2003, pp. 173-175). In spite of its importance for 
cooperation, security issues were not part of the agenda of 
the Miami Summit. * is is why U.S. Secretary of Defense 
William Perry decided to convoke the ! rst Defense 
Ministerial of the Americas Meeting, which was held in 
Williamsburg, Virginia, U.S., in 1995 and perpetuated bi-
annually. Subsequent meetings took place in Bariloche, 
Argentina (1996), Cartagena de Indias, Colombia (1998), 
Manaus, Brazil (2000), Santiago, Chile (2002), Quito, 
Ecuador (2004), Managua, Nicaragua (2006), and the most 
recent one in Ban# , Canada (2008). * e Ninth Conference 
of Defense Ministers of the Americas will be held in 
Bolivia in November 2010. * e Defense Ministerial does 
not take binding decisions, but is regarded as a noteworthy 
discussion forum where current hemispheric security and 
defense topics can be addressed. At the Second Defense 
Ministerial of the Americas in 1996, for instance, the min-
isters identi! ed the lack of civilian experts in the ! eld of 
defense and security as major obstacle to the civilian con-
trol of the armed forces. * ey decided to create the Center 
for Hemispheric Defense Studies, a civilian counterpart to 
the Inter-American Defense 
College, in order to train civil-
ians for positions in defense 
ministries and parliamentary 
defense commissions.
Other hemispheric se-
curity institutions include 
the Inter-American Defense 
Board (IADB) and the Inter-
American Defense College. * e IADB was founded in 
1942 with the purpose of coordinating the defense of the 
Americas during the Second World War. It is based in 
Washington D.C. and according to its statutes, conducted 
by a military representative of the United States. In contrast 
to TIAR, it had not been formally incorporated in the OAS 
structure. For a long time, the IADB did not have much 
signi! cance since the member states did not want to equip 
it with operational capacity. Some OAS member states are 
not even members of the IADB, either because they do not 
have a military (as Costa Rica and some Caribbean states) 
or because the IADB was not considered su)  ciently use-
ful. During the 1990s, it was questioned whether these in-
stitutions were still needed. Many member states felt that 
the IADB constituted an exercise in military diplomacy 
relatively isolated from other dimensions of diplomacy 
and acted according to an outdated Cold War rationale. 
Others, like Argentina and Canada, proposed to integrate 
it into the OAS structure so as to make it a useful tool for 
peace and security (Escudé & Fontana, 1998, p. 59-60).
Besides the security mechanisms properly spoken, 
instruments designed for the promotion and defense of 
democracy can also be interpreted as means for con" ict 
prevention and therefore as parts of the security system 
(Kreimer, 2003, Milet, 2004, Ramírez, 2004, p. 112, Shaw, 
Additional steps toward hemispheric cooperation were taken 
outside the OAS. In 1994, the U.S. hosted the fi rst Summit of 
the Americas, which was interpreted as a signal of departure 
from the former U.S. practice of unilateralism and support for 
authoritarian regimes and towards the promotion of democracy 
and cooperative politics in the region.
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2004, Soto, 2004). Especially a+ er the termination of civil 
wars, it is hardly possible to separate con" ict mediation 
and peacekeeping from measures destined to establish 
and stabilize representative democracy (Muñoz, 1998, p. 
14). * e Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the 
Renewal of the Inter-American System, adopted at the 
OAS General Assembly in Santiago in June 1991, empha-
sized the member states’ “inescapable commitment” to the 
defense of democracy in the region, and the accompany-
ing Resolution 1080 set up procedures of collective action 
in the case of a “sudden or irregular interruption of the 
democratic political institutional process or of the legiti-
mate exercise of power by the democratically elected gov-
ernment” in a member state. * e Protocol of Washington, 
which was adopted at the Sixteenth Special Session of 
the General Assembly in 1992 and entered into force in 
1999, added a new article to the OAS Charter, granting 
the organization the authority to suspend a member state 
whose democratically constituted government has been 
overthrown by force (Boniface, 2007, Gosselin & * érien, 
1999, pp. 179-180, Kreimer, 2003, p. 258). Later on, the 
defense of democracy instruments were merged into the 
Inter-American Democratic Charter, signed on September 
11, 2001 (Cooper, 2004, Graham, 2002, Legler, 2007). With 
it, the OAS broadened its conception of what constitutes 
a democratic crisis to include not only irregular interrup-
tions of the democratic political institutional process, but 
also any “unconstitutional alteration of the democratic 
order”, a phrase applying speci! cally to undemocratic ac-
tions of democratically elected leaders. 
Already in 1990, Canada as a new member of OAS had 
provided the leadership in the creation of the Unit for the 
Promotion of Democracy (UPD). Its main purpose is to 
provide advisory services and technical assistance to help 
OAS members develop democratic institutions and pro-
cedures. Additional mechanisms designed for con" ict 
prevention and resolution and concomitant democracy 
building in the region are the “good o)  ces” capacities of 
the Permanent Council and the Secretary General of the 
OAS as well as the inter-American system of human rights 
(Kreimer, 2003).
Discussion and evaluation
For the OAS, the end of the Cold War was an impor-
tant turning point. In Latin America, the organization 
had always been perceived as an instrument employed 
by the United States to enforce their hegemonic interests. 
According to the international perception, until 1989 the 
OAS had hardly any in" uence and was widely regarded as 
useless. * e end of the Cold War brought about the abol-
ishment of the strategic framework whose main rationale 
was the ! ght against communism. Democratic transitions 
in most Latin American countries as well as the world-
wide movement towards regional integration were addi-
tional factors that pushed forward the revival of the inter-
American system.
* e legal mechanisms and institutions that were estab-
lished in the 1990s were important steps toward security 
cooperation in the hemisphere; the advances with regard 
to arms control regimes and the initiation of con! dence-
building measures on the political as well as on the military 
level reduced insecurity in the region and contributed to 
the settlement of various bilateral rivalries (Hurrell, 1998b, 
Nolte, 2000). In spite of the advances in security policy, 
the OAS’s most signi! cant achievements with regard to 
the adoption of new norms and norm enforcement mech-
anisms were made in the area of democracy promotion, 
which also receives the bulk of attention in the interna-
tional literature (Acevedo & Grossman, 1996, Arceneaux & 
Pion-Berlin, 2007, Boniface, 2002, 2009, Cooper & Legler, 
2001, 2006, Hawkins, 2008, Hawkins & Shaw, 2008, Legler, 
Lean & Boniface, 2007, Levitt, 2006, Muñoz, 1998, Parish 
& Peceny, 2002, Schliemann, 2009, Wei# en, 2009). * e fact 
that member states placed a strong emphasis on the prin-
ciple of representative democracy signals a shi+  in priority 
away from the traditional principles of non-intervention 
and state sovereignty (Shaw, 2004, chapter 7). 
In comparison to the degree of “democratic commit-
ment” that was reached in the Western hemisphere, ad-
vances in the area of inter-American security cooperation 
appear limited (Fontana, 2003). Many institutional tasks 
necessary to reform the inter-American security system 
were not accomplished in the 1990s, and as progenies of the 
Cold War, its components appeared increasingly outdated. 
Although the plan to reformulate the concept of security 
was repeatedly stated, no conclusion on that matter could 
be reached. Hence, in spite of the noteworthy innovations 
described above, a lot of unful! lled tasks remained. As the 
examples of the Inter-American Defense Board and the 
new initiative of the Defense Ministerial of the Americas 
demonstrate, consultations on defense and security issues 
tends to take place outside the OAS framework. * is is an 
expression of Latin American persistent mistrust towards 
the U.S.: A+ er their negative experiences with U.S. inter-
ventionism during the Cold War, Latin American govern-
ments still felt uneasy about cooperating with the U.S. in 
the ! eld of security and defense, so that an initiative to cre-
ate a forum comparable to the Defense Ministerial inside 
the OAS framework would most probably have met with 
their resistance (Bitencourt, 2003).
Hence, in the 1990s, the future of OAS as a regional 
security organization was still unde! ned. Despite the 
highly symbolic nature of the large number of summits 
and the declarations and instruments adopted, there was 
no shared vision with regard to fundamental characteris-
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tics of post-Cold War security cooperation in the Western 
hemisphere. * e U.S. Latin American policy during the 
1990s put an emphasis on economic issues: * e main goals 
were opening up Latin American markets and promot-
ing hemispheric economic integration under the aegis of 
neoliberal economic policies (Carranza, 2009). Moreover, 
fostering and stabilizing democracy was a central aim. * e 
main security issue on the U.S. agenda for the Americas, 
dating back to the 1980s, continued to be the ! ght against 
illegal drug trade. * ree interconnected features related 
to the U.S. role in the hemisphere determined the lim-
ited progress in regional security (cf. Hirst, 2003, p. 57): 
Just like during the Cold War era, the power asymmetry 
between the United States and the rest of the region re-
mained an outstanding characteristic. It meets with a lack 
of coordination of Latin American states vis-à-vis the 
dominant neighbor in the North. Additionally, the relative 
irrelevance of Latin America in U.S. global security con-
siderations became increasingly obvious.
The 2001 Terrorist Attacks: New Challenges to 
Hemispheric Security?
While in the 1990s the countries in the Western hemi-
sphere focused on democratization and economic trans-
formations, security considerations and changes in secu-
rity policy have once again become a frequently debated 
topic from 2001 onwards. From the perspective of the 
United States, multilateral cooperation in the Americas 
was not among its major concerns any longer, while at the 
same time the ! ght against terrorism became the top pri-
ority. Already in the 1990s U.S.-Latin American security 
cooperation had su# ered from mutual distrust and a lack 
of shared visions. However, a+ er the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 and the establishment of a new U.S. 
security doctrine, entailing the United States’ inclination 
to use military force and to ignore the opinion of other ac-
tors in the international system, the gap between U.S. goals 
in security policy and the concerns of the rest of the region 
has widened (Fontana, 2003, p. 171). A+ er September 11, 
there seems to be a move backwards to the U.S. hegemonic 
position of the Cold War: Instead of the ! ght against com-
munism, the war on terrorism is now the most important 
policy goal, and other states are urged to partake in this 
mission.
Hence, September 11 had somewhat contradictory 
e# ects with regard to hemispheric security: On the one 
hand, U.S. attention shi+ ed to other world regions and 
Latin America continued to lose importance. At the same 
time, certain features of the traditional hegemonic posi-
tion of the U.S. in the hemisphere were revitalized: Once 
again, the United States de! ne the enemy, and the Latin 
American states have to act according to these de! nitions 
if they do not want to evoke tensions.
Normative and institutional innovations after 2001
Legal instruments
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, the OAS 
passed a resolution to strengthen the cooperation in the 
prevention and the ! ght against terrorism. In June 2002, 
the member states signed the Inter-American Convention 
against Terrorism, which o# ers a legal framework for co-
operation e# orts and exchange of information on this 
challenge. In April 2001 the * ird Summit 
of the Americas had once again called for a 
thorough review of security issues in light 
of the up to date realities. * e Declaration 
of Bridgetown, approved by the 2002 
General Assembly, already featured a mul-
tidimensional approach to security, which 
was taken up by the Special Conference on 
Security, held in October 2003 in Mexico 
City. * e Special Conference on Security 
issued a Declaration on Security in the Americas (2003) 
which a)  rms the countries’ political will to help preserve 
peace through close cooperation and elaborates on the 
new concept of security:
Our new concept of security in the Hemisphere is 
multidimensional in scope, includes traditional and new 
threats, concerns, and other challenges to the security of 
the states of the Hemisphere, incorporates the priorities 
of each state, contributes to the consolidation of peace, 
integral development, and social justice, and is based on 
democratic values, respect for and promotion and de-
fense of human rights, solidarity, cooperation, and respect 
for national sovereignty. (Declaration on Security in the 
Americas, paragraph 2.)
Paragraph 4 of the Declaration de! nes the “new threats, 
concerns, and other challenges of a diverse nature:
• terrorism, transnational organized crime, the global 
drug problem, corruption, asset laundering, illicit tra)  -
cking in weapons, and the connections among them;
• extreme poverty and social exclusion of broad sectors 
of the population, which also a# ect stability and demo-
cracy. Extreme poverty erodes social cohesion and under-
mines the security of states;
After September 11, certain features of the traditional 
hegemonic position of the U.S. in the hemisphere 
were revitalized: once again, the U.S. defi ned the 
enemy, and the Latin American states were supposed 
to act according to these defi nitions to avoid arousing 
tensions.
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• natural and man-made disasters, HIV/AIDS and 
other diseases, other health risks, and environmental de-
gradation;
• tra)  cking in persons;
• attacks to cyber security;
• the potential for damage to arise in the event of an 
accident or incident during the maritime transport of po-
tentially hazardous materials, including petroleum and ra-
dioactive materials and toxic waste; and
• the possibility of access, possession, and use of wea-
pons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by 
terrorists.”
* e particularity of the Declaration on Security is that 
the “multidimensional” approach is much broader than 
the concept of security commonly referred to in interna-
tional relations (Radseck, 2005, pp. 59-61). Apart from tra-
ditional security threats, like territorial and boundary dis-
putes, this concept encompasses non-traditional security 
threats, such as terrorism, drug-tra)  cking, arms trade and 
contraband, migration and natural disasters. Moreover, it 
also includes aspects of internal security. According to the 
de! nition, genuinely socioeconomic problems like poverty 
and diseases are perceived as security concerns. Hence, the 
Declaration on Security introduces a concept of compre-
hensive security, including challenges conventionally re-
garded as non-military. Some of those non-military risks, 
especially migration, drug-tra)  cking and environmental 
degradation, had already been on the agenda of the inter-
American security system for many years (Hirst, 2003). 
However, the novel aspect about them is that govern-
ments increasingly realize their transnational scope and 
impact. More precisely, these challenges are “intermestic”, 
meaning that they simultaneously a# ect international and 
domestic security. * ey are complex insofar as each chal-
lenge is linked to other security-relevant phenomena and 
the countries are a# ected to a di# erent degree, which com-
plicates the search for a concerted response. Traditional 
“hard power” responses prove to be less e# ective anyway. 
Another new aspect is the involvement of non-state actors 
(cf. Tulchin, 2005, pp. 101-104). * e main rationale behind 
this broad security concept is to represent the wide range 
of security risks and concerns relevant for the di# erent 
sub-regions and thus to exert an integrative function. In 
this manner, the Declaration tries to depict an alternative 
to the traditional U.S. unilateralism. At the same time, the 
principle of collective security guarantees that states help 
and support each other in dealing with their speci! c chal-
lenges, even if they are not a# ected themselves (Bitencourt, 
2001). * e combination of a multifaceted security concept 
and a collective encounter with the threats and risks is 
what distinguishes the “multidimensional, " exible and co-
operative” security architecture.
Whether the multidimensional security concept is an 
integrative and useful innovation or a dangerous in" a-
tion of the security term is highly contested. Kincaid and 
Gamarra (1996) o# er a model of security that encompasses 
three distinct categories: National security includes prepa-
ration for and response to threats to the state’s territory, 
institutions and sovereignty and is traditionally handled by 
the military. Citizen security requires the response to an 
array of threats to individual citizens and lies within the 
responsibility of law enforcement agencies. Public secu-
rity denominates a gray area between national and citizen 
security. It involves threats to the public at large that can 
quickly overwhelm law enforcement agencies and thus re-
quire military resources and expertise. Most of the non-
traditional security threats mentioned in the Declaration 
on Security in the Americas (except for social problems 
like extreme poverty and social exclusion, or diseases such 
as HIV/AIDS and other health risks) fall into the category 
of public security: organized crime (drugs, arms, tra)  ck-
ing in persons etc.), terrorism/weapons of mass destruc-
tion, guerrillas/insurgencies, illegal migration, natural 
and manmade disasters, extreme political instability, and 
border violations (Collier, 2006, p. 15). Additionally, these 
threats might exceed the capacities of internal law enforce-
ment agencies due to their transnational character.
However, due to the creation of this new category, the 
separation between internal security and external security 
or rather defense is increasingly obliterated. * e security 
term becomes di# use and limitless, which means that so-
cial problems or political polarization can easily be de! ned 
as security threat and hence become militarized. * e “se-
curitization” of internal problems and con" icts also wipes 
out the boundary between the spheres of competence of 
armed forces and internal law enforcement agencies. An 
amalgamation of military and police responsibilities and 
in particular an expanded scope of functions for the mili-
tary is very delicate and dangerous, taking into account the 
long Latin American history of military interventions in 
politics (Chillier & Freeman, 2005, Nolte, 2004, pp. 79-80, 
Tulchin, Benítez Manaut & Diamint, 2005, p. 19, Villagra 
Delgado, 2003, pp. 8-9).
Representatives of the U.S. military as well as some 
think tanks, on the contrary, strongly argue in favor of 
tightly intertwining police and military tasks in Latin 
America. Some actually advocate the abolishment of the 
legal separation between those spheres of in" uence. Sure 
enough, some of the transnational security threats, in par-
ticular organized crime and terrorism, indeed exceed the 
capacities of the police forces, and it is doubtful whether 
the strict separation between their internal competences 
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and the external tasks the military is in charge of can be 
upheld in the future. Still, it has to be carefully delineat-
ed in which ! elds it makes sense to draw on the military 
and in which issue areas the armed forces should rather 
not be granted additional in" uence (Rojas Aravena, 2005, 
Villagra Delgado, 2003, pp. 8-9).
Institutions
In the new millennium, the OAS continued its trajec-
tory toward cooperative security initiated in the 1990s, but 
at the same time reinforced its e# orts in the areas of col-
lective security and defense. * e Meeting of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign A# airs is an OAS organ in secu-
rity policy already included in the OAS Charter. However, 
it does not meet on a regular basis, but can be convoked 
upon request of any member state to deal with problems 
of an urgent nature (Shaw, 2004, Stoetzer, 1993, p. 167). 
* roughout the past decade there have only been a few 
meetings: Two of them took place in 2001, addressing the 
terrorist acts perpetrated within the territory of the United 
States on September 11, and the most recent one occurred 
in reaction to the incursion by Colombian military forc-
es and police personnel into the territory of Ecuador in 
March 2008. Triggered by 9/11, even the Inter-American 
Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, which had not been used 
for a long time, was reactivated. Primarily, it implied a dec-
laration of solidarity with the United States.
* e Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) had already 
existed before the OAS was founded in its current form, 
but a+ er the process of democratization in the Americas, 
the IADB was more and more regarded as part of the OAS 
family. * e IADB’s personnel consist mostly of military of-
! cers, typically in the rank of Colonel. Due to its character 
as military organization and its location in Washington 
D.C., it has always been dominated by the U.S. * e IADB 
mainly served as forum for exchange between the militar-
ies of the hemisphere, but apart from this “social” func-
tion, it had a very low performance. During the 1990s, the 
need to clarify the juridical and institutional relationship 
between the IADB and the OAS was repeatedly voiced. 
* e Special Conference on Security requested the CHS to 
maintain regular contact with the authorities of the IADB 
in order to determine the norms that govern the mandate 
of the IADB and its relationship to the OAS. * ence, the 
CHS formed the Working Group to Conclude the Analysis 
of the Juridical and Institutional Link between the OAS 
and the Inter-American Defense Board. As the IADB was 
primarily a military body, the problem of civil-military re-
lations had to be discussed in order to convert it into an 
entity of the OAS and to de! ne its level of subordination. 
* e new statutes of the IADB, ! nally approved in March 
2006, establish a juridical and organizational link to the 
OAS, in particular a close collaboration between the IADB 
and the CHS, and develop new ideas on how to use the 
IADB. * e functions of the IADB will be con! ned to tech-
nical advisory services in the ! eld of military and defense, 
whereas it is not permitted to perform functions of an 
operational nature. Further activities include demining 
in Central America and the development of educational 
programs on regional security. It has also been instructed 
to administrate an inventory of con! dence- and security-
building measures in the hemisphere and to report on the 
application of these measures upon request. * e fact that 
the reports are to be sent to the IADB brings up the prob-
lem that not all OAS member states are members of the 
IADB as well. However, as the new statutes establish that 
states may also send civilian representatives to the IADB, 
those states that do not have a military or refused to par-
ticipate in a purely military environment are now enabled 
to join. Since the link between the IADB and the OAS is a 
very recent achievement, it will be interesting to see how it 
will evolve in the future. 
During the past decade, the OAS has also created new 
measures of con" ict resolution: * e Fund for Peace was 
established by the OAS General Assembly meeting in 
Windsor, Canada in June 2000, in order to address bound-
ary disputes which still 
pose a risk to hemispheric 
security (cf. Fuentes, 2008, 
Mares, 2008). * is mecha-
nism provides ! nancial 
resources to member 
states in order to support 
the peaceful resolution of 
territorial disputes. From 
1999 to 2003, the Fund for 
Peace brokered agreements to resolve disputes between 
Belize and Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua, and El 
Salvador and Honduras. In 2004, the OAS also initiated 
a Special Program for the Promotion of Dialogue and 
Con" ict Resolution as part of the Unit for the Promotion 
of Democracy. A+ er a substantial restructuring of the OAS 
General Secretariat, those con" ict resolution instruments 
are now administered by the Department of Sustainable 
Democracy and Special Missions, which is part of the 
Secretariat for Political A# airs. Since 2005, the Department 
has coordinated special missions to Bolivia where it ac-
companied the electoral process, Ecuador where it assisted 
The particularity of the Declaration on Security adopted at the 
Special Conference on Security held in 2003 in Mexico City is the 
concept of “multidimensional security”, which is much broader 
than the concept of security usually referred to in international 
relations. 
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with the re-establishment of the Supreme Court of Justice, 
Haiti where it provided technical assistance for the 2006 
elections and Nicaragua where it facilitated the dialogue 
a+ er intra-governmental con" ict. In 2004, it set up the ! rst 
genuine OAS peacekeeping mission, consisting of a sta#  of 
more than 100 civilian experts, to support the peace pro-
cess in Colombia.
With respect to con! dence- and security-building 
measures, in 2002 an OAS General Assembly resolution 
convened another Meeting of Experts as follow-up to the 
! rst Meeting of Experts in Buenos Aires (1994) and the 
regional conferences of Santiago (1995) and San Salvador 
(1998) on con! dence- and security-building measures in 
order “to evaluate implementation and consider next steps 
to further mutual con! dence” and “to transmit the conclu-
sions and recommendations of the Meeting of Experts to 
the preparatory body of the Special Conference on Security 
as a contribution to the preparation of that Conference.” 
At this Meeting of Experts, which took place in February 
2003 in Miami, the participants formulated new recom-
mendations building upon the recommendations in the 
Declarations of Santiago and San Salvador. * e Consensus 
of Miami, which was submitted to the Special Conference 
on Security, contains two extensive lists of “military” as 
well as “general” CSBMs. Furthermore, an “Illustrative List 
of CSBMs” was compiled which identi! es measures for fu-
ture consideration and which for the ! rst time attempts 
a systematic classi! cation of CSBMs into diplomatic and 
political measures, educational and cultural measures, and 
military measures. * e document also addresses the need 
to develop cooperative measures confronting the new se-
curity threats and challenges. Moreover, the experts rec-
ommended to use the CHS for further investigation on 
CSBMs. Accordingly, the Declaration on Security mandat-
ed the CHS to constitute itself as Forum on Con! dence- 
and Security-Building once a year, in order to review and 
evaluate existing CSBMs and to consider and propose new 
ones. * e ! rst meeting of this kind took place in April 
2005; the second one was held in November 2006, the 
third meeting of the Forum was in March 2008, and the 
fourth one is scheduled for November 2010. Additionally, 
the Consensus of Miami suggests asking the countries for 
reports on the CSBMs they have carried out. It is desirable 
to monitor the implementation of agreed CSBM through 
the exchange of information, for which the CHS as well 
as the OAS Information System (OASIS) could provide 
an appropriate tool. * e General Assembly has urged 
all member states to provide to the Permanent Council, 
through the CHS, information on their ongoing CSBMs, 
so as to facilitate the preparation of the systematic invento-
ry of these measures. It has also invited the Inter-American 
Defense Board to provide advisory and consultative ser-
vices on CSBMs of a military nature and to keep an up-
dated inventory. 
As it had ful! lled its original task, namely the prepara-
tion of the conference on Security in the Americas and the 
rede! nition of the concept of security, the mission of the 
CHS changed a+ er 2003: It is now responsible for the fol-
low-up on and the implementation of the Declaration on 
Security in the Americas. Although other institutions, such 
as the Defense Ministerial of the Americas and the meet-
ings of the armed forces’ General Sta# , are deemed more 
important for the concrete planning of future con! dence-
building measures between the militaries of the region, the 
Committee’s important task is to increase 
transparency through the collection and 
distribution of information on all types of 
CSBMs. When constituting itself as Forum 
on Con! dence- and Security-Building, the 
CHS has to consider new CSBMs, which in 
the future might also take place between in-
ternal security forces in order to cope with 
new security threats. Additionally, the CHS publishes the 
OAS Roster of Experts in Con! dence and Security Building 
Measures, which, as of July 2009, lists experts from 16 
member states. Moreover, the Committee is in charge 
of collecting information on the member states’ defense 
spending and weapons acquisition. * e annual General 
Assembly resolutions ask them to provide this informa-
tion in compliance with the two regional and global arms 
control measures, namely the Inter-American Convention 
on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition 
and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms 
and United Nations Standardized Reporting of Military 
Expenditures. 
During the 2005-2006 sessions, the majority of the 
Committee’s meetings dealt with the establishment of the 
link between OAS and the IADB. Another important is-
sue in 2005 and 2006 were natural disasters, a topic usu-
ally brought forward by the Caribbean countries, and rein-
forced by the impact of hurricane Katrina. * e 2006-2007 
as well as the 2007-2008 agendas addressed many issues 
that had been postponed due to the intense negotiations 
over the IADB. In the ! eld of traditional security, the CHS 
regularly holds sessions on nuclear nonproliferation, dis-
cussing the consolidation of the regime established in the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco, as well as disarmament and nonpro-
liferation in general, such as the meetings of the states par-
ties of the Inter-American Convention on Transparency 
The “securitization” of internal problems and 
confl icts also wipes out the boundary between the 
spheres of competence of armed forces and internal 
law enforcement agencies.
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in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. In the ! eld of 
new security threats, besides follow-up meetings evalu-
ating the implementation of the Declaration on Security, 
there are regular meetings and working groups that ad-
dress public security, transnational organized crime, the 
problem of criminal gangs, and natural disaster reduction 
and risk management. Additionally, the CHS also follows 
up on other security-related OAS activities, such as the 
work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism 
(CICTE) and the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control 
Commission (CICAD).
Combating terrorism had already been part of the agen-
da of the hemispheric security system ever since the ! rst 
Summit of the Americas. * e initial reasons to deal with 
the topic were the bomb attacks on the Israeli Embassy and 
a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 
1994, respectively. At the 1994 Summit of the Americas, 
the heads of state decided to hold a special conference on 
terrorism which took place in 1996 and adopted an action 
plan. At a follow-up meeting in 1998, it was decided to cre-
ate the CICTE, which was formally set up by the June 2001 
OAS General Assembly. CICAD had already been formed 
in 1986, which illustrates that drug-tra)  cking is one of the 
oldest and most persistent non-traditional security threat 
the Americas are facing. In the 1990s, new provisions re-
garding money laundering were created. 
During the past years, the OAS General Secretariat 
was substantially restructured, giving way for the creation 
of a Secretariat for Multidimensional Security which ad-
dresses traditional as well as non-traditional threats. * e 
Secretariat comprises three departments: the Department 
of Public Security, which deals with topics like orga-
nized crime, public safety, the removal of landmines, the 
Executive Secretariat of CICAD, concerned with drug-
tra)  cking and related criminal activities, and the CICTE 
Secretariat, which is concerned with the ! ght against ter-
rorism and increasingly provides training and coordina-
tion of anti-terrorism activities.
Discussion and evaluation
* e new millennium brought further steps toward a 
new security architecture in the Americas (Franko, 2003). 
* e OAS and the other elements of the inter-American 
security system remain an important forum for security 
cooperation. By means of its Declaration on Security, the 
OAS has signi! cantly contributed to a region-wide discus-
sion and de! nition of new security challenges. At the same 
time, it has continuously addressed traditional security 
threats in the framework of its CHS and by the numerous 
initiatives regarding CSBM, and has even accomplished 
the incorporation of a forum for military exchange and co-
operation, the IADB, into the OAS institutional structure.
Having said that, the heterogeneity of the region as re-
" ected in the broad security concept and the exceptional 
power position of the United States pose into question 
the possibility of close security cooperation. One can 
identify two stages in US post Cold War policy towards 
Latin America and the Caribbean, the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001 being the turning point between them 
(Vilas, 2005, p. 391). Whereas during the 1990s U.S. Latin 
American policy focused on political and economic liber-
alization, in the a+ ermath of September 11, ! ghting terror-
ism became the central objective of the U.S. government. 
Many authors argue that the war against terrorism initiat-
ed by the George W. 
Bush administra-
tion in 2001 gener-
ates the impression 
that the strategic 
framework of the 
Cold War was revi-
talized (Carranza, 
2009, Kurtenbach, 
2002a, Lowenthal, 2009, Tulchin 2005, p. 98). One symp-
tom of this is the tendency of “securitization”, which be-
comes manifest in the utilization of the military for pur-
poses of internal security. Another symptom is the fact that 
once more the U.S. de! nes who is the enemy and thence 
assumes the role of a hegemonic power in the hemisphere. 
It imposes its policy priorities and focuses exclusively on 
the topic of its own major concern, terrorism, losing out of 
sight other urgent problems of the region (cf. Hirst, 2003, 
pp. 62-63, Tulchin, 2005, p. 110, Weeks, 2006). * e ability 
of the U.S. to impose its views on the region is facilitated 
by its power to determine with which governments it col-
laborates and with which ones it does not, according to 
compliance with U.S. political goals, one possible selection 
criterion being the willingness to use the military for the 
! ght against terrorism. 
It has been argued that the multidimensional security 
concept advocated in the Declaration on Security not only 
generates the dangerous tendency to rede! ne economic, 
social or political problems as security risks, but also bears a 
striking resemblance to the U.S. National Security Strategy 
(NSS) adopted a+ er the 2001 terrorist attacks (Vilas, 2005, 
pp. 395-396). * e NSS identi! ed “new threats” that are di-
Due to its character as a military organization and its location in 
Washington, D.C., the Inter-American Defense Board has always been 
dominated by the U.S. It has served mainly as a forum for exchange 
between military offi cers, but apart from the “social” function, it had a 
very low performance.
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rectly headed towards United States’ domestic security. In 
this context, the inclusion of social and ecological as well 
as institutional issues together with terrorism, drug traf-
! cking and organized crime is worth noting. “New threats” 
no longer " ow from actions implemented, encouraged or 
tolerated by “rogue states”, but also from private actors. 
However, as far as Latin America is concerned, the NSS 
also contained some elements of continuity (Vilas, 2005, 
pp. 396-397): Its main objective was Latin American and 
Caribbean alignment with US global interests in political 
and economic matters. Additionally, the war on drugs was 
mentioned as a major issue in the hemisphere.
In spite of the strong in" uence of U.S. security con-
cerns, the characteristic feature of the Declaration on 
Security is that it expresses the heterogeneity of threat 
perceptions in the region. Terrorism, for example, is not 
considered a security risk everywhere in the hemisphere to 
the same degree. For the majority of Latin American coun-
tries, international terrorism does not pose an imminent 
threat. Anyhow, in compliance with the collective defense 
paradigm, most states chose to collaborate with the United 
States on this score. A case in point is the “triple border” 
between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay, where these adja-
cent countries primarily worry about transnational crime 
such as contraband and money laundering, but also agreed 
to combat terrorism jointly with the U.S. who targeted 
the area as a retreat for Islamic terrorists. For the Central 
American and Caribbean states which are increasingly af-
fected by climate change and recurrent hurricanes, natu-
ral disasters pose a severe security concern, whereas other 
countries see no need to address them as challenges to se-
curity. * e Andean countries, in 
turn, are a# ected by illegal drug 
trade and related crime as well as 
by the internal instability result-
ing from this sordid business. 
As mentioned before, the U.S. 
do not hesitate to advocate and 
actively support the deployment 
of the armed forces as a means to ! ght internal and in-
termestic threats. Especially the Latin American countries 
that are or in the near past have been a# ected by guer-
rilla warfare and drug-tra)  cking follow suit. In contrast, 
the Southern Cone countries advocate a strict separation 
between internal security and defense. A+ er the end of 
their military dictatorships, they have struggled hard to 
constrain the armed forces’ sphere of activity and to pre-
vent their interference in domestic politics and they worry 
that these achievements might be put into question by the 
broad hemispheric security concept (Pion-Berlin, 2005).
Barack Obama’s opening statement at the ! + h Summit 
of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago in April 2009 
heralded a change toward a greater emphasis on multilat-
eral diplomacy and genuine consultation with partners in 
the hemisphere. However, there was no radical shi+  with 
respect to hemispheric security policies. Given other for-
eign policy priorities inherited from its predecessor and 
the budgetary pressures it faces a+ er the global ! nancial 
crisis, the Obama administration is unlikely to give more 
aid money or even attention to Latin America. Moreover, 
there have not been any major personnel or organizational 
changes in the US Southern Command, the military unit 
responsible for security cooperation with Central and 
South America, which means that there is continuity in 
many aspects of its mission, such as the “counter drug/
counter narcoterrorism” programs for Colombia, Mexico 
and Central America. For reasons of pragmatism as well 
as principle, Obama would be wise to elevate the impor-
tance of the OAS. A broad range of hemispheric concerns 
– including security and defense cooperation, the promo-
tion of democracy and human rights, trade, immigration, 
drugs, and the environment – can be usefully addressed 
in the organization. Indeed, the OAS is precisely the right 
forum to air important policy di# erences on such conten-
tious issues involving the US, Canada, and the countries 
of Latin America and the Caribbean. It also has developed 
methodological expertise in each of these issue areas.
The Effectiveness of the Inter-American Security 
System: Current Problems and Prospects for the Future
Some observers criticize the OAS security arrange-
ments in general and argue that the e# ectiveness of inter-
American treaties and declarations is limited (Diamint, 
2004): An increasing number of agreements, meetings 
and summits are managed by a limited number of o)  cers 
with precarious resources. Some of the policies accorded 
at presidential meetings are mere personal commitments, 
which means that they remain government instead of state 
policy and are abolished as soon as a new political party 
takes o)  ce. In various cases, the executive branches, for 
example the ministries of defense, do not have the power 
to enforce new hemispheric directives geared towards the 
military. Additionally, the OAS is weak when it comes to 
concrete measures of con" ict resolution. It can provide po-
litical support for a democratic government under assault 
and condemn transgressions of the constitutional order, 
but it does not have the means to carry out strong eco-
nomic sanctions, let alone military interventions.
Whereas during the 1990s U.S. policy to Latin American 
focused on political and economic liberalization, in the 
aftermath of September 11 fi ghting terrorism became the 
central objective of the U.S. government.
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* e low e# ectiveness of its instruments as well as the 
problems generated by the subjective and multifaceted na-
ture of the term “security” in the Western hemisphere lead 
to frequent calls for reforms of the inter-American secu-
rity system (Bitencourt, 2003, Radseck, 2005). However, in 
spite of its limitations, the OAS is the only regional secu-
rity organization recognized and accepted by all countries 
of the hemisphere. With the Rio Treaty and the IADB, it 
disposes of the sole multilateral security architecture, and 
with CICAD and CICTE it also hosts specialized organiza-
tions covering the new, intermestic security threats. It is 
also obvious that the United States foster collective action 
through the OAS bodies, as there is no competitive insti-
tutional framework. It is even arguable whether the OAS 
would still exist had the U.S. not been a member state. In 
spite of all mistrust and suspicion against the regional he-
gemonic power, Latin American politicians have always 
been interested in the OAS as a forum where they can ex-
change opinions with U.S. government representatives and 
directly communicate their views and concerns to their 
northern neighbor.
Much of the critique raised against the OAS actually 
derives from a comparison with other, more advanced re-
gional security organizations such as NATO. Compared 
with the NATO, of course, the OAS appears highly ine# ec-
tive. However, not all regional security organizations nec-
essarily have to model themselves on the NATO, and in the 
case of the OAS, there are even good reasons why it should 
not develop in that direction: According to Mares (1997, p. 
218), no regional organization in the Americas that has the 
United States as a member should have a military capac-
ity. U.S. resources would just overwhelm everyone, and the 
group would fall under its control. Hence, Mares (1997) 
states that collective inter-American security schemes in 
terms of defense integration are inappropriate.
* is leads to the question how to classify the inter-
American security architecture. In his analysis of regional 
security problems, Barry Buzan (1991, pp. 186-229) de-
scribes the regional level of analysis as an intermediary 
level between the state and the international system as a 
whole. In the international system, a regional system me-
diates between global and local security dynamics. A re-
gion should not be considered as an arbitrarily-de! ned 
set of countries, but as a distinct system of states closely 
united by geographical vicinity, and whose security re-
lations are so signi! cant as to establish the location of 
boundaries with other regional formations. In order to 
! nd an analytical device for identifying and delineating 
regional formations, Buzan introduces the term “security 
complex”, de! ned as “a group of states whose primary se-
curity concerns link together su)  ciently closely that their 
national securities cannot realistically be considered apart 
from one another” (Buzan, 1991, p. 190). Members of a 
security complex are o+ en linked by what Lake (1997, 
p. 31) refers to as a “security externality”. He describes a 
regional security complex as a set of states a# ected by at 
least one trans-border, but local, externality that emanates 
from a particular geographic area. If the local externality 
poses an actual or potential threat to the physical safety 
of individuals or governments in other states, it produces 
a regional security system or complex. While the Western 
hemisphere is united by geographical proximity and clear 
distance from other regional formations, the other criteria 
for a regional security complex are not ful! lled: Security 
concerns à la Buzan and local, trans-border externalities in 
line with Lake’s terminology link together subsets of coun-
tries within the region, but not the region as a whole.
In the OAS Charter, the organization is referred to as a 
system of collective 
security. Rooted in 
the principle of “all 
for one and one for 
all”, collective secu-
rity is a coalition-
building strategy 
whereby a group of 
nations agree not 
to attack one another. Furthermore, the concept of collec-
tive defense, which is articulated by the Rio Treaty, implies 
the defense of each nation against aggressions by exter-
nal enemies. While collective security and collective de-
fense will remain unrealizable goals and probably should 
remain so due to the heterogeneity of threat perceptions 
and the power asymmetry between member states, the 
changed global and regional context allows the nations of 
the Western hemisphere to pursue cooperative security. 
Unlike collective defense and security, cooperative secu-
rity is not based on a common threat perception. * e con-
cept also accepts the reality of diverging security concepts 
and of an unequal degree of intensity of collaboration and 
alliances within the region. A cooperative security sys-
tem is restricted to de! ning security, discussing risks, and 
the promotion of peaceful change based on agreed-upon 
norms, rules and procedures.
* is description aptly characterizes the OAS and its ac-
tivities in the security realm. * e OAS’s main achievement 
is the extension of its essential principles, in particular de-
Barack Obama’s opening statement at the fi fth Summit of the Americas 
in Trinidad and Tobago in April 2009 heralded a change toward greater 
emphasis on multilateral diplomacy and genuine consultation with 
partners in the hemisphere. However, there was no radical shift with 
respect to hemispheric security policies.
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mocracy, human rights, and peaceful con" ict resolution, 
to the entire hemisphere and the vitalization of the mere 
declaratory norms by the adoption of a number of new 
monitoring and norm enforcement instruments and spe-
cialized organizations. When assessing only its most visible 
and thoroughly symbolic activities, it still appears to be a 
predominantly intergovernmental organization. However, 
the vast array of new institutions, even if their e# ect on se-
curity and defense policies adopted by the nation states is 
minimal, have made consultations of functionaries on the 
lower levels of state bureaucracy a more frequent occur-
rence in between Summits and General Assembly meet-
ings (Dembinski, Freistein & Wei# en, 2006, Franko, 2003). 
In political day-to-day business, the OAS functions as a 
discussion forum creating awareness of other countries’ 
and sub-regions’ security concerns. * e establishment of 
trans-bureaucratic networks which resulted from the es-
tablishment of new legal instruments and institutions in 
the inter-American security system and lead to frequent 
contacts between functionaries in security and defense 
policy can be regarded as a value in itself.
* e heterogeneity of the region, however, impedes 
steps toward more substantial defense cooperation, let 
alone defense integration. * e diversity of interests of the 
member states and the close cooperation between certain 
sub-regional groups is o+ en regarded as a problem of the 
OAS, entailing its low capacity to act. In fact, there are 
many questions where a region-wide consensus is di)  cult, 
if not impossible to achieve. * is results in compromises 
like the Declaration on Security, where all states and sub-
regions were able to peg down their particular de! nition 
of security. In consequence, joint hemispheric declarations 
usually have a high symbolic value, but a low applicabil-
ity and assertiveness. In terms of practicability of the ad-
opted collaboration measures, sub-regional and bilateral 
cooperation mechanisms seem to be more e)  cient than 
hemispheric initiatives. Some of them are an expression of 
the Latin American states’ disappointment with the OAS 
and other hemisphere-wide institutions such as the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) project, and hence 
explicitly pursue alternative models of regional integra-
tion excluding the U.S. Some sub-regional integration 
schemes and agreements, such as the Common Market 
of the South (Mercosur), the Andean Community, the 
Central American Integration System, the Rio Group and 
the new Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) 
have seen signi! cant advances since the 1990s. * ey usu-
ally had a more direct impact on national policies and were 
sometimes more successful in the resolution of con" icts 
and crises: During its summit in 2008, the Rio Group set-
tled the dispute caused by the border skirmish between 
Ecuador and Colombia, while UNASUR played a key role 
as a mediator in the 2008 secession crisis in Bolivia and 
the diplomatic crisis between Colombia and Venezuela in 
mid-2010. In direct competition with the OAS, UNASUR 
has established the South American Defense Council as a 
mechanism for regional security and defense. * e inten-
tion is not to form a NATO-like alliance, but a coopera-
tive security arrangement, enhancing multilateral military 
cooperation, promoting con! dence- and security-building 
measures and fostering defense industry exchange. 
* e overlap of security institutions in the Americas can 
be termed a multilevel security architecture. 
According to Tulchin, Benítez Manaut and 
Diamint (2005, pp. 22-23), there are ! ve lev-
els or contexts in which security policies in 
the Americas can be analyzed: the interna-
tional, hemispheric, sub-regional, bilateral 
and national level. On the international level, 
geographical unity suggests that the Western 
hemisphere is a regional system character-
ized by interdependence in economic and 
security realms. In fact, the Americas are 
o+ en viewed as an entity when examining their relation 
to other world regions like Asia or Europe or when diag-
nosing its general a)  liation with “the West”. However, on 
the hemispheric level, the problem of power asymmetry 
within the region is obvious. * e hemisphere consists of a 
superpower lumped together with one of the most unim-
portant world regions in a strategic sense. * is imbalance 
yields the disproportionate in" uence of the United States 
as regional hegemon and also creates di)  culties regarding 
the implementation and continuation of hemispheric con-
ventions and agreements. 
On the sub-regional level, we ! nd the hemisphere di-
vided into several sub-regions – North America, Central 
America and the Caribbean, the Andean countries and the 
Southern Cone –, which are rather homogeneous and share 
the same problems. * erefore, several sub-regional organi-
zations have developed, and although many of them were 
originally designed as economic integration schemes, they 
have increasingly addressed security as well. * e mem-
bers of the Central American Integration System signed 
the Framework Treaty on Democratic Security in Central 
America in 1995. In the Andean Community, steps toward 
security cooperation, such as con! dence building mea-
In spite of the mistrust and suspicion against the 
hegemonic power, Latin American politicians have 
always been interested in the OAS as a forum 
where they can exchange opinions with American 
representatives and directly communicate their views 
and concerns to the U.S. government.
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sures and the exchange of information between the armed 
forces, had been envisioned already in 1989. In 1998, the 
Southern Cone countries signed the Political Declaration 
of Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile as a Zone of Peace. 
On the bilateral level, some countries, in particular 
Argentina, Chile and Brazil, have achieved the settlement 
of rivalries dating from colonial times and have built up 
bilateral cooperation mechanisms in defense and security 
matters, which, in some cases, are very e# ective. On the 
national level, certain commonalities between the states, 
usually not across the hemisphere, but within the sub-re-
gions, are striking. Whereas some countries share a com-
parable legacy of military dictatorship and the need to re-
organize civil-military relations, others are or were faced 
with similar internal con" icts and guerrilla warfare. * ese 
analogies between agendas were a main catalyst of bilateral 
and sub-regional cooperation.
Because of the multilevel structure, the asymmetry 
between the U.S. and Latin America on the hemispheric 
level could also constitute a chance. Compared to the Cold 
War era, the autonomy of Latin American countries and 
sub-regions has improved, thanks to their relations with 
other world regions and the new sub-regional integration 
schemes which decrease the OAS’s leverage as Washington’s 
“political tool in order to discipline Latin American gov-
ernments” (Vilas, 2005, p. 390). While the shi+ ing focus 
of US foreign policy can be interpreted as a downgrading 
of Latin America from a previously higher rank on the US 
foreign policy agenda, that lack of attention can also be 
understood as enlarging the room for maneuver for Latin 
American governments to advance alternative develop-
ment strategies more in tune with the demands of their 
populations as well as building or strengthening intra-Lat-
in American agreements at both governmental and civil-
society levels (Franko, 2003, Vilas, 2005).
It is the responsibility of Latin American politicians and 
diplomats to take the lead and promote their interests in 
inter-American relations. As a hemispheric institution, the 
OAS and the inter-American security architecture can only 
be fully functional if member states’ governments want it 
to be so. Despite all reservations, dialogue and exchange 
of information on defense and security in the hemisphere 
have unfolded noteworthy dynamics since the 1990s. Due 
to the heterogeneity of security concerns in the region, 
not all the problems have to be solved on the hemispheric 
level and are o+ en better addressed by sub-regional and 
bilateral institutions. At the same time, the inter-American 
security system which includes the U.S. and Canada per-
forms valuable and complementary functions to the other, 
entirely Latin American forums and organizations. Both 
the U.S. and Latin American government take stock in the 
maintenance of close contacts and cooperation in defense 
and security matters through the inter-American institu-
tions.
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